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Abstract
In this paper, we present a decision tree model for evaluation of the next generation radiation
portal technology (Advanced Spectroscopic Portals or ASPs) to scan containers entering the
United States non-intrusively against nuclear or radiological weapons. Advanced Spectroscopic
Portals are compared against the current designs of portal monitors (plastic scintillators or PVTs).
We consider five alternative deployment strategies: 1) Exclusive deployment of ASPs replacing all
the PVTs currently deployed at U.S. ports of entry, 2) Sequential deployment of ASPs with PVTs
installing ASPs in all secondary and some primary inspections areas, 3) Sequential deployment of
ASPs with PVTs installing ASPs in only secondary inspections areas, 4) Exclusive deployment of
PVTs, 5) Stop deployment of new portal monitors and continue inspections with the current
capacity. The baseline solution recommends a hybrid strategy that supports the deployment of new
designs of portal monitors for secondary inspections and current designs of portal monitors for
primary inspections. However, this solution is found to be very sensitive to the probability of
attack attempt, the type of weapon shipped through ports of entry, the probability of successful
detonation, detection probabilities and the extra deterrence that each alternative may provide. We
also illustrate that the list of most significant parameters depends heavily on the dollar equivalent
of overall consequences and the probability of attack attempt. For low probability and low
consequence scenarios, false alarm related parameters are found to have more significance. Our
extensive exploratory analysis shows that for most parametric combinations, continued
deployment of portal monitors is recommended. Exclusive deployment of ASPs is optimal under
high risk scenarios. However, we also show that if ASPs fail to improve detection capability, then
extra benefits they offer in reducing false alarms may not justify their mass deployment.
KEYWORDS: decision tree, radiation portal monitors, advanced spectroscopic portals, border
security, terrorism
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION  
Securing the United States (U.S.) homeland against a terrorist attack using a 
nuclear or radiological weapon has been an increasing concern in recent years. 
Many homeland security experts contend that containers could be a perfect 
medium to deliver dangerous nuclear or radioactive material. According to a 
survey of national security and non-proliferation experts compiled in 2005 by 
U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (Lugar 2005), the median probability estimate of a 
nuclear attack somewhere in the world is 0.1 and 0.2 in the next 5 and 10 years 
respectively. For a radiological dispersion device (RDD, or dirty bomb), these 
figures jump to 0.25 and 0.40.  
While these numbers are probably too high due to common biases in 
probability estimation, they reflect concerns based on evidence. There were 827 
confirmed cases of illicit nuclear and radiological materials trafficking worldwide 
between 1993 and 2005 (IAEA 2006). A dirty bomb ingredient was discovered in 
more than 65% of these cases; whereas 16 incidents involved trafficking of highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu). Some experts believe that terrorists 
could build a crude nuclear weapon if they can acquire a sufficient amount of 
HEU or plutonium (see Bunn and Wier 2006, Allison 2004, Maerli et al. 2003). In 
addition, Rosoff and von Winterfeldt (2007) developed a model on the feasibility 
of a dirty bomb attack upon the twin Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach that 
shows if terrorists can successfully complete the planning and preparation tasks of 
an attack, there is a reasonable chance that they can accomplish their mission.  
To counter this threat, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has been deploying non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment to ports of entry 
(POEs). NII equipment at U.S. ports include gamma-ray and x-ray scanners, 
radiation portal monitors (RPMs), personal radiation detectors and handheld 
radioactive isotope identification devices. RPMs are the only equipment used in 
primary inspections to detect the presence of nuclear or radioactive material. 
Earlier designs of RPMs, “plastic scintillators”, (also known as poly-vinyl 
toluene, PVT, portal monitors) have been criticized for two reasons. First, they are 
ineffective in detecting shielded nuclear material emitting low level of radiation 
(i.e. highly enriched uranium, HEU). Second, they cannot distinguish between 
harmless and dangerous nuclear and radiological materials thus leading to false 
alarms. To address these concerns, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
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yet approved $1.2 billion requested mainly due to concerns raised by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and lawmakers (GAO 2007a). DHS 
has been conducting field tests that are expected to prove that ASPs will 
demonstrate a significant increase in operational effectiveness (see NRC 2009 pg. 
29 for the criteria determined by DHS that should be satisfied as an indication of 
significant increase in operational effectiveness).  
This article presents a decision tree model that examines the costs and 
benefits of deploying ASPs. A similar model is discussed in Bakır (2008). This 
paper expands on the model in Bakır (2008) by analyzing incoming containers at 
all POEs in U.S and evaluating the ASP deployment strategies that are considered 
by DNDO. Also, more recent information made available by the GAO and other 
reports warrant a new and a deeper look into the problem. We focus on a scenario 
of an attack using either a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb. We parameterize the 
probability of attack, the probability of weapon detection, and the effectiveness of 
ASPs in reducing the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack and providing 
more deterrence.  The model accounts for the cost of false alarms, the economic 
consequences of a successful attack and the probability of discovering the weapon 
after smuggling through the border. While we do not obtain precise probabilities 
of critical events, we determine optimal decisions for realistic parameter values. 
SECTION II: DESCRIPTION OF THE DECISION TREE 
Figure 1 displays the decision tree used to evaluate five alternatives: “Deploy 
ASPs”, “Hybrid”, “ASP secondary”, “Deploy PVTs” and “Do nothing”. The 
chain of events following each alternative is identical. However, the probability 
and cost parameter values associated with these events are different, and are 
assigned based on the estimates in the open literature. The objective is to 
minimize overall expected equivalent costs (EEC) in dollar terms. EEC includes 
the cost of countermeasures, the dollar equivalent cost of human casualties, the 
impact on the U.S. economy and the cost of false alarms.  
(DNDO) contracted the development of advanced passive detection technology. 
This technology could reduce the false alarm rate while improving the detection 
performance against shielded nuclear and radioactive material. These next 
generation RPMs, known as Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs), have 
already been through their initial development phase. However, despite DHS’s 
efforts to advocate the deployment of ASPs at U.S. POEs, the U.S. Senate has not 
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DNDO has not completed its task to deploy RPMs to all U.S. ports. The current 
plan is to complete deployments by 2013 (GAO 2008). As of October 23, 2008, 
1,145 RPMs have been installed (Medalia 2008). The goal is to bring that number 
up to 2,754 (GAO 2008). DNDO could consider five alternatives to reach this 
goal. The first alternative, “Deploy ASPs”, considers an inspection scheme that is 
based on an exclusive use of ASPs for scanning containers. This includes the 
replacement of PVTs that are currently operational at POEs and the installment of 
new ASPs. The second alternative, “Hybrid”, is based on DNDO’s project plan to 
deploy new RPMs to U.S. POEs. The goal is to use ASPs in both primary and 
secondary inspections at high volume ports and to keep PVTs in primary 
inspections at other ports. The third alternative, “ASP secondary”, is similar to the 
“Hybrid” alternative, in that both ASPs and PVTs will be installed at U.S. POEs. 
The difference is that ASPs will be deployed exclusively to perform secondary 
inspections while all primary inspection areas will be occupied by PVTs. The 
fourth alternative, “Deploy PVTs”, calls for continued installment of PVTs 
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without the use of ASPs. Finally, DNDO has a “Do nothing” alternative that 
discontinues the deployment of RPMs and uses only the 1,145 PVTs that are 
currently installed at POEs.  
Probabilities and Effectiveness Parameters for the Decision Tree 
Each countermeasure decision is followed by the same event sequence, albeit with 
different probabilities of occurrence. In estimating the baseline probability of an 
attack attempt using a containerized radiological or nuclear weapon through 
POEs, p, we considered the following factors: The probability of an attempted 
attack somewhere in the world, the conditional probability that this attack would 
occur in the U.S., and the conditional probability that an attack in the U.S. would 
involve entry of the weapon through a U.S. POE.  Since we consider both an 
RDD and a nuclear attack, we set the baseline probability of this event to be 
relatively high, at p = 0.20 in 10 years for the “Do Nothing” alternative, realizing 
that the analysis would consider the whole range of probabilities from 0 to 1. 
Table 1: Deterrence of Countermeasure Alternatives 
Min Base Max 
Deterrence of "Deploy ASPs", dA 0 0.20 1 
Deterrence of "Hybrid”, dH 0 0.15 1 
Deterrence of “ASP Secondary”, dAS 0 0.15 1 
Deterrence of “Deploy PVTs”, dP 0 0.10 1 
The base value for p does not incorporate any deterrence that new PVTs 
and ASPs may offer. We revise the probability of attempt under each alternative 
by multiplying p with a deterrence coefficient (i.e., For “Hybrid”, pH = p x (1-
dH)). Table 1 lists the coefficients for alternatives that require deployment of new 
RPMs. The “Do nothing” alternative does not offer extra deterrence (i.e., dN = 0). 
The deterrence levels are set to reflect the improvements in HEU detection 
probability. Since “Hybrid” and “ASP Secondary” alternatives call for a partial 
deployment of ASPs, we assume they are equally deterrent. The detection 
improvement of all alternatives over the “Do nothing” alternative is minimal. 
Hence, the baseline deterrence levels are set to low values between 0.10 and 0.20. 
We let all parameters fluctuate between 0 and 1 because in fact there is no means 
of estimating the actual deterrence. However, a baseline value is needed to do 
sensitivity analysis. The resulting conditional probabilities are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Baseline Probabilities and Ranges for the Decision Tree in Figure 1  
Min Base Max 
Attempt, Deploy ASPs, pA 0 0.16 1 
Attempt, Hybrid, pH 0 0.17 1 
Attempt, ASP Secondary, pAS 0 0.17 1 
Attempt. Deploy PVTs Only, pP 0 0.18 1 
Attempt, Do Nothing, p 0 0.20 1 
The next node in the decision tree models the weapon choice given an 
attempt. We assume an attempt for a nuclear attack with probability 0.25 (π) and 
for an RDD attack with probability 0.75 (1-) regardless of the countermeasure 
alternative. This is consistent with most experts’ opinion that an RDD attack is 
much more likely than a nuclear attack, primarily because terrorists can access 
RDD materials much more easily than HEU or Pu. The node that follows the 
choice of a nuclear weapon is the choice between a plutonium- or an HEU-based 
nuclear weapon. We assume that both events are equally likely irrespective of the 
countermeasure alternative, thus h = (1-h) = 0.5.  
The next event in the tree is whether the weapon arriving at a POE is 
interdicted by non-intrusive inspections. The detection probability depends on the 
weapon material and the particular countermeasure alternative chosen. The 
baseline probabilities are our rough judgments that were anchored on the 
probability of detecting an RDD and adjusted in line with experts’ opinions about 
the relative detectability of RDD or nuclear materials with the possible 
technological and deployment options. The ranges of detection probabilities are 
the same for all alternatives (in Table 3). PVTs and ASPs can both detect the 
gamma radiation emitted by an RDD and neutron radiation emitted by a 
plutonium-based nuclear weapon. HEU detection is difficult due to the low dose 
of radiation emitted. Terrorists may also apply shielding to avoid detection. 
Hence, the probability of detecting an HEU-based nuclear weapon is considerably 
lower. Experts also believe that ASPs will not improve HEU detection capabilities 
significantly (Cochran 2008).  
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Table 3: Detection Probability under Various Countermeasure Alternatives 
"Deploy ASPs" Min  Base Max 
    Probability of detecting an RDD, rA 0 0.90 1 
    Probability of detecting a plutonium-based nuclear weapon, tA 0 0.75 1 
    Probability of detecting an HEU-based nuclear weapon, uA 0 0.35 1 
"Hybrid" Min  Base Max 
    Probability of detecting an RDD, rH 0 0.90 1 
    Probability of detecting a plutonium-based nuclear weapon, tH 0 0.75 1 
    Probability of detecting an HEU-based nuclear weapon, uH 0 0.35 1 
"ASP Secondary" Min  Base Max 
    Probability of detecting an RDD, rAS 0 0.90 1 
    Probability of detecting a plutonium-based nuclear weapon, tAS 0 0.75 1 
    Probability of detecting an HEU-based nuclear weapon, uAS 0 0.33 1 
"Deploy PVTs" Min  Base Max 
    Probability of detecting an RDD, rP 0 0.90 1 
    Probability of detecting a plutonium-based nuclear weapon, tP 0 0.75 1 
    Probability of detecting an HEU-based nuclear weapon, uP 0 0.30 1 
"Do nothing" Min  Base Max 
    Probability of detecting an RDD, rN 0 0.85 1 
    Probability of detecting a plutonium-based nuclear weapon, tN 0 0.70 1 
    Probability of detecting an HEU-based nuclear weapon, uN 0 0.25 1 
The target is an urban area that will be hit after the weapon crosses the 
border. There is a chance of failure because law enforcement agencies may foil 
the plot, or weapon detonation may fail. Hence, we add a final node at the end for 
the detonation event. The probability of successful detonation depends solely on 
the type of the weapon. We use a base probability of 0.75 for an RDD (sRDD) and 
0.25 for a nuclear weapon (sNW). The ranges for both parameters are unrestricted. 
Cost Estimates 
We primarily use the information in GAO (2008) to estimate the cost of each 
alternative. GAO estimates procurement, deployment, maintenance, design and 
development as well as sustainment costs for the project plan prepared by DNDO 
in 2006. We call this the “Hybrid” alternative. DNDO’s 2006 plan is to deploy 
1,034 ASPs and 1,548 PVTs for use in primary and secondary inspections. We 
directly use the cost figures in GAO (2008) for this alternative.  
The costs of other alternatives are calculated under the following 
assumptions. On average, each PVT costs $55,000 while each ASP costs 
$377,000 (GAO 2007a). The procurement cost estimated in GAO (2008) includes 
computer and spares procurement as well. Therefore, we use an approximate unit 
procurement cost of $100,000 for a PVT and $400,000 for an ASP. O’Harrow 
(2008) reports the deployment cost as $400,000 and $325,000 per unit for ASPs 
and PVTs respectively. This includes the cost of one-year maintenance contract, 
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which is approximately $6,600 per PVT and $80,000 per ASP. Hence, we assume 
a unit deployment cost of $318,000 for each portal monitor. Design and 
development cost should be zero for “Do nothing” and “Deploy PVTs” 
alternatives because GAO’s estimate includes the cost of developing various 
designs of ASPs only. We assume that the personnel costs for security operations 
at U.S. POEs are the same under all strategies that call for deployment of new 
portal monitors. For the “Do nothing” alternative, we use a lower sustainment cost 
estimate of $250,000,000.  
Table 4: Itemized 10-Year Cost of Countermeasure Alternatives, $ 
Procurement Deployment Maintenance 
Design & 
Development Sustainment 
Deploy ASPs, cA 1,030,078,208 818,912,176 2,048,173,915 464,477,573 364,988,656 
Hybrid, cH 603,678,393 689,107,870 999,242,369 464,477,573 364,988,656 
ASP Secondary, cAS 305,044,061 478,477,922 558,999,260 464,477,573 364,988,656 
Deploy PVTs, cP 150,453,771 478,442,993 182,851,295 0 364,988,656 
Do nothing, cN 0 0 84,129,477 0 250,000,000 
Table 5: Ranges for the Cost of Countermeasure Alternatives, (in million $) 
Min  Base Max 
Deploy ASPs, cA 3,000 4,727 7,000 
Hybrid, cH 2,600 3,100 3,800 
ASP Secondary, cAS 1,500 2,172 3,000 
Deploy PVTs, cP 500 1,177 2,000 
Do nothing, cN 0 334 500 
Table 4 lists the estimates of total procurement, deployment, maintenance, 
sustainment and design and development costs for each alternative. The total cost 
for “Deploy ASPs” is calculated assuming that 2,754 ASPs will be installed. 
Under “Deploy PVTs”, we assume that 1,609 PVTs will be installed, which is the 
difference between the number of RPMs originally planned for deployment, and 
the number of RPMs currently operational. For “ASP Secondary”, we make a 
baseline assumption regarding the ratio of RPMs required around U.S. in primary 
inspections vs. secondary inspections. The baseline ratio is 4 to 1 (i.e. number of 
PVTs at primary inspections / number of ASPs at secondary inspections ~ 4). The 
range of cost estimates is selected to include all ratios between 10 to 1 and 2 to 1. 
The calculations are based on a gradual deployment strategy and a 3% discount 
rate to account for the time value of money. The estimates are rounded to the 
nearest million dollars. The baseline estimates (the sum of the cost elements in 
Table 4) and associated ranges for each alternative are listed in Table 5.  
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False Alarms 
The cost of false alarms is factored into the decision as part of the indirect costs of 
each alternative. The most challenging piece in calculating the cost of false alarms 
is the estimation of the average cost a single false alarm, cf. To our knowledge, 
there is no study on the average cost of a false alarm in the open literature. Cost of 
a false alarm should include delay costs as well as the physical examination costs. 
Currently, Hong Kong Container Terminal Operators Association charges $1500-
$2000 (Wein et. al. 2007) per physical examination. In this paper, we assume that 
physical examination costs $1500, and approximately 10% of containers that are 
flagged by false alarms are subject to further physical examination (the others 
being subjected only to external surveys with handheld detection devices). 
Therefore, the expected physical examination cost per container that triggers a 
false alarm is $150 (see Table 6 for false alarm cost estimates). 
False alarms may cause delays as well. Currently, most false alarms are 
resolved quickly (Rooney 2005). Hence, delay costs should be negligible. We 
recognize in reality that the delay impact of false alarms should have a non-linear 
behavior if we perturb their percentage up to 100%. In fact, a study by Bakshi et. 
al. (2009) on container delays at foreign ports concludes that almost all containers 
should be delayed if the fraction of inspected containers reaches 8-9% even under 
relatively optimistic conditions. Hence, delay costs could become quite significant 
if the percentage of inspected containers exceed 8-9%. As such, to back up our 
assumption of negligible delays, we choose 8% as the maximum value for the 
percentage of false alarms. We use 2.5% for the baseline value of the percentage 
of scanned containers that generate false alarms (Rooney 2005). Under the 
assumption of insignificant delays, a range between 0 and $1000 for the average 
cost of a single false alarm is reasonable and a base value of $150 is justified. 
Table 6: Parameters Associated with the Cost of False Alarms 
Min Base Max 
Percentage of false alarms, f 1% 2.50% 8% 
Number of incoming containers per year (in millions), N 15 20.4 25 
Average cost of a false alarm, $, cpf 0 150 1000 
The reduction of false alarms is an important benefit of ASPs. Cochran 
(2008) states that ASPs could reduce false alarms regardless of whether they are 
deployed at primary inspections replacing PVTs or at secondary inspections 
complementing PVTs in primary inspections. According to the ASP evaluation 
report released by the National Research Council of the National Academies, a 
performance goal is an 80% reduction in the false alarm rate (NRC 2009). We 
take this as the baseline for the false alarm benefit of the DNDO’s 2006 plan (i.e., 
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“Hybrid” alternative reduces false alarms by 80%). “Deploy ASPs” alternative is 
assumed to perform slightly better and reduce false alarms by 85%. As far as the 
annual number of incoming containers, we use a base value of 20.4 million, which 
is the sum of approximately 9.2 million containers arriving at seaports and 11.2 
million trucks crossing land POEs each year (Bonner 2005, Wasem et. al. 2004). 
  
Table 7: False Alarm Effectiveness Parameters, % Reduction 
Min Base  Max 
Reduction in the percentage of false alarms for “Hybrid” alternative, feH 0 80 100 
Reduction in the percentage of false alarms for “Deploy ASPs” alternative, feA 0 85 100 
Economic Consequences 
The economic consequences of a successful attack include the overall cost to the 
U.S. economy and the dollar equivalent of fatalities. The overall cost to the U.S. 
economy includes direct and indirect costs of business disruption as well as 
evacuation, property damage and decontamination costs. The cost of fatalities is 
computed by multiplying the value of life, which is $5 million in the base case, 
with the number of fatalities. The value of life varies between 0 and $10 million 
in sensitivity analyses. The number of fatalities for an RDD attack depends on the 
location of attack, the source and the amount of radiological material as well as 
the path of the plume. We do not elaborate on the mechanics of the radiation 
exposure. Instead we refer to the high scenario estimates in Rosoff and von 
Winterfeldt (2007). We set a base value of 100 for the number of fatalities due to 
blast and acute radiation effects as well as latent cancers (range from 0 to 200).  
Fatality figures for a nuclear attack will be much more dramatic. The 
estimates vary depending on the attack location, the size of the bomb and how the 
attack is executed. It is estimated that as high as one million people may die if 
Manhattan is targeted (Abt Associates 2003). However, most nuclear security 
experts believe it is unlikely that terrorists will acquire a weapon with a yield to 
cause such a huge number of fatalities. According to a study by the Council on 
Foreign Relations, setting off a one-kiloton nuclear weapon in Manhattan would 
generate about 200,000 casualties (Garwin 2002). As such, we take the nuclear 
attack death toll to be between 50,000 and 400,000 people (base value = 
150,000).  
The estimates of overall costs to the U.S. economy vary. Gordon et al. 
(2005) studies the impact of an RDD attack upon the Ports of Los Angeles & 
Long Beach and finds that an attack followed by a 120-day shutdown could cost 
$34 billion. However, this excludes decontamination and property damage costs 
that could be significant in an urban area. According to a study by Defence 
Research and Development Canada, an urban area attack could cost up to $250 
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billion in Toronto, $80 billion in Vancouver and $75 billion in Windsor (Bronskill 
and Bailey 2007). Our base value for economic costs of an RDD attack, ERDD is 
$300 billion (range is between $100 billion and $600 billion). The cost of a 
nuclear attack should be much higher. A RAND study estimates the cost of an 
attack at the Ports of Los Angeles & Long Beach to be around $980 billion 
excluding decontamination and business disruption costs (Meade and Molander 
2006). Business disruption and decontamination costs could easily add another $1 
trillion to this estimate. Hence, we use a base value of $2 trillion for the overall 
cost of an urban nuclear attack, EN (range is between $500 billion and $3 trillion).  
SECTION III: DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
The optimal decision in our model minimizes overall EEC for a set of parameter 
values. In the baseline case, the model recommends the “ASP Secondary” 
alternative (EEC ~ $19.25 billion) and picks “Hybrid” as the close second best. 
“Do nothing” performs worse than the other four alternatives (EEC ~ $24.22 
billion). This suggests continuation of the deployment of RPMs.  
Figure 2: Tornado Diagram to Analyze the Sensitivity of EEC to the Top 20 
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Figure 2 compares the impact of the 20 most significant parameters that 
EEC is sensitive to. The probability of attempt is the most significant parameter. 
Two crucial parameters that determine the likelihood of a successful nuclear 
attack are also quite significant. In general, since the negative consequences of a 
nuclear attack are higher, the tornado diagram highlights the sensitivity of EEC to 
parameters associated with a nuclear attack. Not surprisingly, all deterrence 
parameters are quite influential on EEC due to their direct impact on the 
probability of attempt. Regarding the weapon material, detection of HEU is 
critical. None of the current technologies is assumed to identify HEU with a high 
probability. Therefore, further reduction of terrorism risk by correctly identifying 
a containerized HEU-based nuclear weapon is recommended by our model. 
Figure 3: Tornado Diagram to Analyze the Sensitivity of EEC to the Top 20 
Significant Parameters in the Model Under Different Scenarios  
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The most significant false alarm parameter is the average cost of a false 
alarm. While the model does not discount the importance of false alarms, extreme 
consequences considered here cause the parameters on the risk of terrorism rank 
higher than the false alarm parameters. In fact, the percentage of false alarms and 
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the average cost of a false alarm are not among the most significant parameters. 
Figure 3, which shows the top 20 significant parameters for low-consequence and 
low-probability scenarios, supports this claim. In the low-probability scenario, all 
parameters except the probability of attack attempt, p, are kept at their baseline. 
We set p to 0.05. In the low-consequence scenario, we reduce the baseline value 
of the economic consequences of a nuclear attack to $1 trillion, the economic 
consequences of an RDD attack to $100 billion, nuclear attack casualties to 
50,000 and RDD attack casualties to 50. All other baseline parameter values are 
unchanged. The average cost of a false alarm and the percentage of false alarms 
have more influence on the optimal EEC, particularly in the low-probability 
scenario. The optimal decision becomes “Deploy PVTs”. When the terrorism risk 
is lower than the baseline, extra benefits of ASPs do not justify their deployment. 
In addition, deterrence parameters lose significance slightly, and EEC remains to 
be sensitive to the expected economic consequences of a nuclear attack. Human 
losses become more significant as well. Perhaps surprisingly, cost parameters 
exert minimal influence on the optimal decision even when we consider reduced 
consequences or lower probability of an attack attempt. 
Figure 4: Two-way Sensitivity Analysis for Parameters p and sNW 
Baseline decision
The two-way sensitivity plot in Figure 4 analyzes the optimal decision as 
we perturb p and the probability of successful detonation of a nuclear weapon, 
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sNW. A non-linear trade-off between alternatives exists as a function of p and sNW. 
As the nuclear attack risk increases, the model recommends deployment of ASPs. 
In fact, when p exceeds 0.05 and sNW is over 0.02, deployment of ASPs is optimal 
for most parametric combinations. We also observe that the baseline decision is 
close to a breakeven point between “ASP Secondary” and “Hybrid” alternatives. 
Hence, it is sensitive to critical parameter values and falls into three different 
regions if we perturb p between 0.15 and 0.25. Conversely, significant changes to 
the baseline values are required to justify exclusive deployment of ASPs rather 
than the other two hybrid alternatives. Similar conclusions hold in the two-way 
sensitivity plot between sNW and the probability of a nuclear attack given an 
attempt is made (π). 
Figure 5: Two-way Sensitivity Analysis for Parameters cf and f 
  
False alarms do not have much influence on EEC. However, since EEC 
values for the top three alternatives are close in the baseline case, they have some 
influence on the optimal decision as illustrated in the two-way sensitivity plot (see 
Figure 5) for the percentage of false alarms (f) and the average cost of a false 
alarm (cf). This plot reveals that “Deploy ASPs” may be justified for reducing the 
cost of false alarms only when the rate exceeds 6.5% and the cost of a single false 
alarm is over $850. The “Hybrid” alternative is economically sound in most cases 
due to the reduction in false alarms offered by ASPs used in primary inspections. 
However, “ASP Secondary” is optimal in the baseline case.   
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A major criticism by the Government Accountability Office is based on 
the initial field tests in which ASPs did not perform better than PVTs in detecting 
nuclear material. In this paper, we assumed that ASP deployment increases the 
probability of detecting an HEU-based nuclear weapon by around 0.05. Parallel to 
this, “ASP Secondary”, “Hybrid” and “Deploy ASPs” alternatives were assumed 
to provide extra deterrence because the probability of interdiction is assumed to 
be better. Our last analysis is to observe the behavior of the optimal decision if we 
drop the assumption that ASPs perform slightly better than PVTs in detecting 
HEU and thus are a higher deterrent to the adversary. We set the base probability 
of detecting an HEU-based nuclear weapon to 0.30 under “Do nothing”, and to 
0.33 under all other alternatives. We keep the deterrence parameter value at 0 for 
the “Do nothing” alternative, and set a uniform deterrence value of 0.10 for all 
other alternatives. In this case, the base case optimal decision is “Deploy PVTs”. 
Figure 6: Two-way Sensitivity Analysis for Parameters cf and f under the 
Equal Detection Probability Scenario 
Figure 6 demonstrates that there is a fine trade-off between “Hybrid” and 
“Deploy PVTs” alternatives when we drop the assumption that ASPs improve the 
probability of detecting HEU. The “Hybrid” alternative can be preferred under 
this scenario when the cost of false alarms and the percentage of false alarms are 
high.  For example, if the percentage of false alarms is 3% and the cost of a single 
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false alarm is twice its baseline value, the “Hybrid” alternative is cost effective. 
Then, “ASP Secondary” is dominated by “Hybrid” because of the reduced false 
alarm benefits in primary inspections provided by “Hybrid”.  
SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS 
In an effort to reduce the nuclear terrorism risk, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has been deploying portal monitors that inspect cargo containers 
non-intrusively. However, current designs of portal monitors (PVTs) have been 
criticized for their limited capability in detecting shielded highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) and for generating high rate of false alarms. In response, DHS is 
planning to install the next generation portal monitors (ASPs) and improve non-
intrusive inspections. In this paper, we developed a decision tree model that 
evaluates alternative policies on possible replacement of PVTs by ASPs. The base 
case decision recommends design of an inspection scheme that employs PVTs in 
primary inspections and ASPs in secondary inspections. The analysis indicates 
that the decision is quite sensitive to several parameters: The probability of attack, 
the probability of successful detonation of nuclear weapon, and the probability 
that a nuclear weapon is used in the attack are the most important parameters. The 
tornado diagram generated for a wide range of values around base parameters 
reveals that deterrence parameters, the probability of detecting HEU under 
various alternatives and the consequences of a nuclear attack are significant.  
The cost of the “Deploy ASPs” alternative is considerably higher than that 
of all other alternatives. Therefore, it is optimal only if there is a high probability 
of success to terrorists and thus a high benefit of interdiction. “Deploy PVTs” is 
justified under low risk scenarios and when we drop the assumption that ASPs 
improve detection capability. The baseline decision is very close to the breakeven 
point between “ASP Secondary” and “Hybrid” alternatives. Slight changes in the 
probability of an attack, and the baseline HEU detection probability could cause 
changes in the baseline optimal decision as well. Furthermore, parameters 
associated with false alarms are of secondary importance in the baseline case. 
However, they are critical in determining the optimal deployment strategy under 
low-probability and low-consequence scenarios, as would be the case if we were 
primarily concerned with radiological devices instead of nuclear ones. They are 
also significant if we assume that ASPs do not improve detection of nuclear 
material. The results indicate in this case that the cost and the rate of false alarms 
could still justify deployment ASPs along with PVTs.  
The model presented in this paper includes 39 parameters. We assign 
reasonable ranges based on unclassified information and analyze whether 
replacement of current portal monitors with the new technology is justified. The 
results indicate that an inspection scheme that employs a hybrid deployment 
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strategy is reasonable, and exclusive deployment of the new technology requires 
further proof that they improve the detection capability as well.  
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